



T his book provides a quantitative history of ﬁnancial crises in their 
various guises. Our basic message is simple: We have been here be­
fore. No matter how different the latest ﬁnancial frenzy or crisis al­
ways appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with past 
experience from other countries and from history. Recognizing these 
analogies and precedents is an essential step toward improving our 
global ﬁnancial system, both to reduce the risk of future crisis and to 
better handle catastrophes when they happen. 
If there is one common theme to the vast range of crises we 
consider in this book, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether 
it be by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often 
poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of 
cash can make a government look like it is providing greater growth 
to its economy than it really is. Private sector borrowing binges can 
inﬂate housing and stock prices far beyond their long-run sustainable 
levels, and make banks seem more stable and proﬁtable than they re­
ally are. Such large-scale debt buildups pose risks because they make 
an economy vulnerable to crises of conﬁdence, particularly when 
debt is short term and needs to be constantly reﬁnanced. Debt-fueled 
booms all too often provide false afﬁrmation of a government’s poli­
cies, a ﬁnancial institution’s ability to make outsized proﬁts, or a 
country’s standard of living. Most of these booms end badly. Of course, 
debt instruments are crucial to all economies, ancient and modern, 
but balancing the risk and opportunities of debt is always a challenge, 
a challenge policy makers, investors, and ordinary citizens must never 
forget. 